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Uncertain Knowledge.
Studying “Truth” and
“Conspiracies” in the Digital Age
Introduction
Henri Boullier, Baptiste Kotras and Ignacio Siles
1 It is nowadays commonplace to find statements about how the web has increased the
circulation and reach of “conspiracy theories” 1. In France, the attack on the Capitol by
QAnon activists in January 2021, and before that the attacks of 2015, or the surveys
commissioned by the Jean Jaurès Foundation, have fueled many alarming discourses
about the spread of “fake news” on the internet. The pandemic context in which we
have been living since March 2020, which is marked by a high level of uncertainty and
the complex intertwining of  scientific,  political,  and geostrategic  controversies,  has
strengthened the grip of the notion that the internet and social media now massively
contribute  to  the  disinformation  of  the  public.  It  is  true  that  in  reducing  the
gatekeeping power of journalists and in easing access to publication for many people,
the massification of the social web endowed a certain number of narratives, positions,
and  ideologies  with  more  visibility  in  the  public  space  than  they  previously  had
(Cardon, 2010). At the same time, the logics that shape the algorithmic hierarchization
of online information on many platforms (Beer, 2017; Gillespie, 2014) have contributed
to the formation of “filter bubbles,” which are relatively hermetic and ideologically
homogeneous  spaces  that  tend  to  reinforce  the  beliefs  of  individuals  rather  than
exposing them to other discourses.
2 If these findings are now well documented in the scholarly literature, understanding
what is commonly known as “conspiracism”, “conspiracy”, or “fake news” remains--at
least in France--incomplete: it lacks both a rigorous and shared conceptual framework,
capable of accounting for the complexity of ongoing reconfigurations and empirical
investigations focused on the materiality of the varying phenomena that these terms
refer to. To achieve this goal, we propose to bring together three bodies of literature
that  are  rarely  in  dialogue  with  one  another  on  these  research  objects:  pragmatic
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sociology, which is well equipped to think about the social conditions of elaboration
and circulation of critique; the sociology of the digital, and the great variety of studies
on web cultures, the political effect of algorithms, or the social uses of information,
largely ignored by the dominant discourses on conspiracism; and finally, science and
technology  studies,  a  field  that  is  attentive  to  the  materiality  of  knowledge,  to
controversies, and is anchored in a requirement for symmetry, which is more than ever
necessary to think about these phenomena. Based on the investigations gathered in
this  dossier  on  "uncertain  knowledge",  this  thematic  issue  intends  to  offer  both
empirical  and  theoretical  contributions  to  the  study  of  the new  tensions  that
characterize the social production of truth on the web and beyond.
3 Having  examined  the  main  strands  of  literature  in  the  social  sciences  that  have
addressed the issue of “conspiracy theories,” in the remainder of this paper we discuss
choices  of  terminology  and  develop  some  theoretical  ideas  for analyzing  the
phenomena usually included as part of this label. We conclude by presenting the five
contributions to this issue of RESET.
 
The Ups and Downs of the Conspiracy Category in the
Social Sciences
Biases, Shortcomings, Craziness: The “pathologizing paradigm” of
Conspiracism
4 It is a challenge to produce a synthesis of the research on “conspiracy theories”2, given
the number of essays that have been produced about this issue over the last thirty
years, both in France and in the countries of the Global North. Without any attempt at
exhaustivity, in what follows we summarize a certain number of salient features of and
trends in this growing body of work. We also refer to the very impressive--and very
complete--work of synthesis carried out by Pierre France (2019). He mapped out the
growing  interest  of  the  French  humanities  and  social  sciences  on  the  question  of
conspiracy theories, from the 1980s onwards, under the impetus of liberal historians
such as  Léon  Poliakov  (1980) or  Pierre  Nora  (1981),  who  specialized  in  the
historiography of anti-Semitism and are concerned with its contemporary resurgence3.
These studies, precursors to a series of more recent books (Taguieff, 2004, 2006), are
part of a strongly functionalist approach that envisions conspiracy as the reaction of a
social  body affected by “modernity”.  They strive to uncover the many avatars of  a
“rhetoric” that remains unchanged over the course of various (troubled) eras, despite
its reformulations4. This research thus tends to make “conspiracy theories” a ready-
made object, a transparent and ahistorical category. By so doing, this body of work
often ignores the effects of labeling, cross-accusations, and the dynamics of inclusion
and exclusion involved in these processes.
5 In addition to this body of work, rooted in the French intellectual landscape, France
(2019) identified a second strand of research of U.S. origin and more recently imported
into  the  French  debate,  which  stems  primarily  from  social  psychology.  Following
Richard Hofstadter's pioneering work, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (2008), first
published in 1964, this approach is originally characterized by its reliance on the lexical
field of mental pathology (obsession, paranoia), and seeks to objectivate (often through
quantitative  surveys  or  social  experiments)  the  factors  that  lead  individuals  to
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“adhere” to a conspiracy statement--a category that is not questioned as such either.
Rather, the ambition is to shed light on the psychosocial profile of the “conspiracist”
and  the  cognitive  mechanisms  of  their  belief,  always  conceived  as  a  “strong,
unconditional and pathological adhesion” (France, 2019, pp. 10, our translation).
6 These approaches have gained renewed interest in recent years in some areas of French
research, as illustrated by the translation of Hofstadter's work in 2012. Gérald Bronner
is  undoubtedly  the  most  obvious  representative  of  this  perspective,  which  also
resonates strongly with the typical framing of this phenomenon in the media (Kreis,
2015). Bronner’s approach, ostensibly focused on the individual “biases” of belief and
inspired by the behavioral and neurological sciences, shares with the above-mentioned
literature  an  uncompromising  positivism,  which  presupposes  the  evident  boundary
between the “true” and the “false.” This approach also reflects an overtly normative
conception of  “conspiracy” as  the result  of  the “cognitive demagogy” of  narratives
“based on an unveiling effect that appeals to the less honorable and yet more intuitive
slopes  of  our  minds”  (Bronner,  2015,  pp.  11,  our  translation).  It  reactivates  an
aristocratic conception of the public space where the general public, easily fooled, must
in good logic step aside to the benefit of the learned. Where do these narratives come
from? What exactly do they contain? How are they put into circulation, appropriated,
invested by various publics? These questions remain, for the most part, unanswered.
Most importantly, even though the diffusion of the internet is still considered a crucial
factor in the success of conspiracy theories, this approach often lacks the support of
empirical research and largely ignores the findings of research from social scientists on
the significance of the internet (Beuscart, Dagiral, & Parasie, 2016; Martin & Dagiral,
2016)5.
7 At the international level, the social psychology approach has materialized over the
last  few  decades  into  a  large  number  of  works,  particularly  in  political  science.
Hofstadter’s seminal work profoundly influenced a large number of researchers who
tend  to  disqualify  “conspiracy  theories”  as  examples  of  “bad  science,”  or  as
unreasonable, irrational, and even delusional beliefs. Butter and Knight (2018, pp. 34)
refer to research derived from this approach as the “pathologizing paradigm,” which
envisions  conspiracy  theorists  primarily  as  groups  of  “radicals”  or  “paranoids”
operating on the  margins  of  society.  This  is  the  implicit  approach of  Sunstein and
Vermeule (2009), for whom conspiracy theories are “crippled epistemologies” (p. 211)
that result from lack of information or individual logical flaws.
8 Starting in the 1990s, work in social psychology has been devoted to discovering the
motivations  and  psychological  factors  that  lead  people  to  believe  in  certain  ideas
(Uscinski,  2020).  In  essence,  van  Prooijen  and colleagues  (2020) note,  psychological
explanations  have  been  operationalized  as  a  mix  of  two  main  groups  of  factors:
individual  (such  as  trust,  openness  to  experience,  agreeableness,  education  level,
narcissism,  and  authoritarianism,  among  others)  and  environmental  (such  as
distressing  societal  events,  group  conflicts,  and  power  issues,  etc.).  Douglas  and
colleagues  (Douglas,  Sutton,  &  Cichocka,  2017,  pp.  538) thus  classified  the
“psychological  factors [that]  drive the popularity of conspiracy theories” into three
groups:  epistemic  (a  search for  understanding of  people’s  environment),  existential
(the  sense  of  security  and  control  in  people’s  environment),  and  social  (the
construction of a positive image of oneself and of social groups). Methodologically, this
research  has  generally  approached  the  psychology  of  conspiracism  through
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quantitative studies and, more recently, through experiments, which test hypotheses at
a micro level. The role of individual and environmental factors is typically measured by
scales  (Martin,  2020) through  which  researchers  have  constructed  psychological
profiles of those who believe in “conspiracy theories” (Douglas et al., 2019).
9 Finally, the links between political affiliations and belief in conspiracy theories have
also been of interest to researchers in psychology and political science. These studies
have stressed that espousing these theories can exert significant political consequences
for democracies (Uscinski, 2018). Van Prooijen and colleagues (2015), for example, posit
a  statistical  association  between  political  “extremism”  and  belief  in  conspiracy
theories.  Uscinski  and  Parent  (2014) maintained  that  “conspiracy  theories  are  for
losers” (p. 130), by which they meant that social groups that feel powerless are more
prone to believe in “conspiracy theories.” 
10 Although  these  quantitative  studies  help  to  measure  the  significance  of  certain
demographic and cultural variables in the adoption of certain ideas, they are limited
when it comes to understanding diffuse and interactive collective phenomena, linked
to a variety of online and offline sociabilities. These studies impose a powerful framing
effect by positing finite lists of belief items that are naturalized as a “classic” in surveys
(J.F.  Kennedy's  assassination,  9/11,  vaccines,  etc.).  They  also  run  the  risk  of  self-
fulfillment through acquiescence bias, as shown by a recent survey from Allcott and
Gentzkow  (2017) in  which  respondents  stated  that  they  “remembered”  false
information that had circulated significantly during an election in similar proportions
to the false “placebo” information made up by the interviewers. As Butter and Knight
aptly summarize,
“Looking  to  produce  axiologically  neutral,  empirical  research  on  ‘conspiracy
theories’  is  a  fallacy,  for  the  concept  in  itself  is  not  axiologically  neutral.
Quantitative  research  about  the  psychological  traits,  cognitive  routines  and
demographics  of  conspirative  thinking is  progressing on slippery ground,  for  it
lacks the historical and sociological comprehension of their object of study” (Butter
& Knight, 2015, pp. 30‑31, our translation).
11 To overcome these  theoretical  and methodological  shortcomings,  other  researchers
have  preferred  to  conceptualize  “conspiracy  theories”  as  collective  cultural
constructions. We examine this body of work in the next section. 
 
Culturalist Approaches to “Conspiracy Theories”
12 Other approaches have sought to challenge the “pathologizing paradigm” in conspiracy
research by privileging issues of meaning. One way has been to understand what makes
theories  themselves  appealing  to  people,  thus  investigating  the  particularities  of
“conspiracy theories” themselves rather than the cognitive traits of those who espouse
and share them. Barkun (2003) thus concluded that “conspiracy theories” share three
principles: “nothing happens by accident,” “nothing is as it seems,” and “everything is
connected.” Harambam (2020a) identified six themes that tend to recur in conspiracy
theories:  finance,  the  media,  corporations,  science,  governments,  and  supernatural
powers.
13 For Wood and Douglas (2018), the content of “conspiracy theories” is ultimately “about
power”  (p.  251).  In  this view,  “conspiracy  theories”  are  a  political  issue  in  itself
(Fenster,  1999).  By  analyzing  both  scholarly  research  and  media  discourses  on
conspiracy  over  time,  Thalmann  (2019) traced  a  historical  shift  in  the  issues  that
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characterize  “conspiracy  theories”:  rather  than focusing on an “‘enemy without,’  a
foreign or outside power or organization plotting the demise of the community,” they
center on the “‘enemy within’: these encompass subversives or spies, as in the anti-
communist  conspiracy  theories,  as  well  as  corrupted  politicians,  presidents,  and
institutions that are perceived and portrayed as vague and diffuse threats” (p. 12).
14 Another important way to examine issues of meaning have been empirical studies of
“conspiracy  theories”  as  culture  (Harambam,  2020a).  This  represents an  important
departure from the “pathologizing paradigm.” By considering a set of cases throughout
the history of the United States, Barkun (2003) traced the shift of “conspiracy theories”
from the fringes to the core of American culture. In a similar vein, Katharina Thalmann
(2019) argues that, contrary to common assumptions, conspiracy theories have been
present  “throughout  all  American  history”  (p.  4).  According  to  her,  these  theories
counted  as  legitimate  knowledge  and  were  widely  circulated  among  members  of
political, intellectual, and spiritual elites. Thalmann shows how prominent figures in
the history of the United States (from the country’s founders to prominent figures to
elected politicians) thus held “conspiracy theories” about issues such as a British plot
against the American colonies or a Catholic plot to menace religious freedom in 19th
century America.  According to her,  what changed in the mid-20th century was the
symbolic status of conspiracy theories: “Throughout much of American history, it had
been considered foolish not to believe in the existence of conspiracies or not to heed
warnings  about  perfidious  plots,  but  starting  in  the  mid-1950s,  it  was  increasingly
considered foolish and ridiculous to believe in or spread conspiracy theories” (p. 8).
This stigmatization affected the style, form, and forum of these theories.
15 Alternatively, works that are closer to the cultural studies tradition have preferred to
understand “conspiracy theories” as situated expressions of cultural concerns (Dean,
1998;  Goldberg,  2001;  Knight,  2000) or,  as  Aupers  (2012) puts  it,  “a  radical  and
generalized  manifestation  of  distrust  that  is  embedded  in  the  cultural  logic  of
modernity” (p. 22). Following the example of the historical studies mentioned above
(Nora, Taguieff),  such research seeks to link this type of discourse to broader social
motives  while  espousing  an  empirical  and  comprehensive  approach  to  the  publics
involved. One example of works that analyze “conspiracy theories” as culture comes
from Harambam’s (2020a) two-year ethnographic study in the Netherlands. The author
posits  a  “sociological  and  cultural  approach”  that  emphasizes  three  dimensions:
meaning (to study conspiracy theorists without comparing them to any standard of
normality),  diversity  (to  recognize  that  conspiracy  theorists  are  characterized by  a
multiplicity of traits rather than unidimensional factors), and relationality (to consider
them  as  deeply  related  rather  than  isolated  groups).  For  Harambam,  conspiracy
theories  are  a  culture  in  that  they  represent  “a  broader  societal  conflict  over
knowledge  and  truth  in  contemporary  societies,  forcing  a  reconsideration  of  what
counts as legitimate knowledge, and why” (p. 213). He followed participants in various
counter-narratives  as  they engage in  a  “hermeneutics  of  suspicion” through which
they seek to find out “the real  truth” about the world.  In doing so,  he shows that
conspiracy theories are linked to wider disputes about the authority and legitimacy of
institutions (scientific  institutions in this  case)  in the production of  knowledge and
truth (Harambam & Aupers, 2015).
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Skepticism, Ignorance, and the Contestations of Science
16 The production of  scientific  claims,  as  well  as  their  reception by certain critical  or
“skeptical”  audiences,  have  long  been  central  issues  in  the  field  of  Science  and
Technology Studies (STS). Although they have rarely addressed the issue of “conspiracy
theories” (see Baskin, 2019; Harambam, 2020b, 2021; Prasad, 2021 for a few exceptions),
these studies focus instead on the social fabrication of truth. They have, for example,
studied the modes of production of objectivity in the scientific field (Daston & Galison,
2007) and the power relations at work in the production of knowledge and forms of
ignorance  (Gross  &  McGoey,  2015).  In  this  way,  they  provide  a  particularly  useful
toolbox for studying the mechanisms, instruments, and types of evidence mobilized to
support or challenge dominant narratives as well as counter-narratives, particularly in
relation to complex scientific, technical, and health concerns. More specifically, STS
work has documented cases in which the challenge to science does not stem from lay or
even  marginal  populations  but  rather  from  economically  dominant  actors  such  as
multinational corporations.
17 In recent years, a growing number of studies have focused on the issue of ignorance by
focusing on the influence of economic actors on the production of knowledge.  This
research invite to revisit the sociology of science through studies of the controversies
surrounding  the  toxicity  of  chemicals  (Henry,  2017;  Markowitz  &  Rosner,  2002),
cigarettes  (Michaels,  2008),  or  the  existence  of  climate  change  (Oreskes  & Conway,
2010) as consequences of the production of ignorance that is sometimes intentional
(Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008), sometimes systemic (Frickel et al., 2010; Gross & McGoey,
2015). 
18 In Merchants of Doubt, a landmark work in the field, Oreskes and Conway (2010) draw
parallels  between  the  strategies  deployed  by  the  tobacco  industry  and  big  oil
companies  to  cast  doubt  on the deleterious  effects  of  their  activities.  In  the 1970s,
tobacco  companies  launched  major  campaigns  to  showcase  the  shortcomings  of
research on the dangers of tobacco. According to Oreskes and Conway, the same tricks
were used thirty years later by large fossil fuel industry conglomerates, such as Exxon
and  British  Petroleum,  when  they  worked  to  spread  doubt  about  climate  change:
showcasing  scientists  who argued that  there  was  no  absolute  consensus  about  this
matter and that available data could be interpreted in multiple ways, and mobilizing
prominent conservative media in order to buy time and maintain the status quo. 
19 These investigations thus detail the concrete mechanisms through which knowledge is
produced but, mostly, how ignorance is maintained: preventing the implementation or
funding  of  studies  in  areas  of  research  (“undone  science”)  (Hess,  2015),  sidelining
potentially inconvenient data (Dedieu & Jouzel, 2015; Rayner, 2012), using of forms of
knowledge that are likely to maintain the status quo (Boullier & Henry, 2020; Kleinman
&  Suryanarayanan,  2013),  establishing  supposedly  independent  institutions  or
recruiting scientists through industry funds (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Although these
analyses have sometimes been taken up in a monolithic way to denounce “industrial
capture” and have shown little interest in the role of journalists or activists in this
work of accusation, they also offer a major benefit: they help identify the strategies
deployed by dominant actors to defend their interests and allow a better understanding
of “real” conspiracies.
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20 More broadly, a number of studies show the significance of a sociology inspired by STS
for understanding how the general public criticizes science. Mede and Schäfer (2020)
thus theorized a “science-related populism” that takes various forms: the reaffirmation
of “common sense” and individual experience as a source of truth (van Zoonen, 2012)
or, on the contrary, the claim of a positivist grammar that aims to “re-establish” the
project of authentically disinterested scientific knowledge (Harambam & Aupers, 2015;
Ylä-Anttila, 2018).
21 On this emerging front of research, vaccine policies constitute an ideal case to observe
contemporary tensions regarding the reception of science. In contrast to analyses that
denounce the role of the “anti-vaccination” (“antivax”) movement (Kata, 2012; Tafuri
et al., 2014), studies such as those conducted by Blume (2006) and Ward et al. (2019)
have questioned this label. These authors argue that this work of labeling is often used
to discredit and delegitimize people or groups supporting certain narratives, and to
present them as ideologists who oppose vaccination all together. They show that these
actors are of various kinds and articulate a diversity of critiques, which often focus on a
particular  vaccine  and  not  on  the  principle  of  vaccination,  or  on  an  ingredient  or
adjuvant that is incriminated for its toxicity. These authors also deal with how labeling
a  certain  group  of people  as  “anti-vaccine”  is  a  public  issue.  Based  on  surveys
conducted among journalists and content analysis, Ward (Jeremy Ward, 2019; Jeremy K.
Ward, 2017) showed that labeling people as “antivaxers” was the result of a boundary
work in which journalists drew a line between “good science” and its opponents. This
boundary  work  was  also  performed  by  “pro-science”  activists,  as  illustrated  by
emerging work on the resurgence of rationalism (Laurens, 2020), particularly on social
media (Foucart, Horel, & Laurens, 2020).
 
The Absence of Digital Worlds
22 In  general,  the work on “conspiracy theories”  we have discussed thus  far  tends to
ignore insights from scholarly research on digital  media,  their cultures and usages.
Digital  media  are  often  given  a  marginal  role,  are hardly  problematized,  or  are
considered an obvious factor in the dissemination of conspiracy narratives and ideas
because  of  the  pulsional  liberation  enabled  by  “anonymity,”  the  proliferation  of
“trolls,”  the  astroturfing of  bots,  and the  importance  of  other  deviant  subcultures.
Comments  on  participation  on  the  internet  shares  some  characteristics  with  the
complaint against “downgraded and frustrated intellectuals,” which emerged at the
beginning of the twentieth century (Boltanski, 2014, pp. 198), as well as the panic of
literate elites against the massification of the press in the nineteenth century (Lemieux,
2000).
23 Beyond these anathemas, findings in the social sciences on the uses of digital media
open  up  an  immense  field  of  research,  which  could  shed  light  on  the  tensions
surrounding the production of truth on the web. As an example, when we searched the
archives  of  the  journal  Réseaux,  a  key  reference  in  the  study of  digital  in  French-
speaking  contexts,  we  only  found  approximately  twenty  articles  that  included  the
terms  “conspiracy”  or  “conspi*”  (full  text),  and  less  than  fifteen  about
“disinformation.” However, there are a few notable exceptions: a special issue of the
French journal Quaderni (2017/3), with articles by Julien Giry (2017) and Pierre France
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and Alessio Motta (2017) on the participants of the ReOpen 9/11 forums, devoted to the
search for alternative explanations of the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
24 Others, such as Franck Rebillard (2017), have focused on the “document supports” of
so-called conspiracy discourses on social media. Although he does not fundamentally
question  the  content  of  this  category,  Rebillard  offers  elements  for  assessing  the
argumentative patterns that are specific to these discourses, and thus paves the way for
a better understanding of the “chains of reference” (Martine & De Maeyer, 2019) that
characterize the stabilization of a counter-narrative. Another set of studies has also
focused on certain actors located at the intersection between “conspiracy theories” and
far-right militancy, such as Jammet and Guidi’s (2017) article on Swiss “reinformers,”
or Harsin’s (2018) on groups close to “Manif pour Tous.” Finally, several recent articles,
based on the massive collection of digital corpuses (via Twitter in particular), have shed
light on the varying motives and intensities of online criticism of lock-down measures
related  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic  (Berriche,  Do,  &  Tainturier,  2020),  or  of  the
controversy over the therapeutic value of hydroxychloroquine and the figure of Didier
Raoult (Smyrnaios, Tsimboukis, & Loubère, 2020).
25 There are many more studies in the English-speaking world, particularly in the field of
computational social sciences, which focuses on the intersections of digital media and
“conspiracy theories.” Although it is not possible to develop an exhaustive list here, we
would  like  to  mention the  quantitative  analyses  carried  out  by  Allgaier  (2019) and
Faddoul et al. (2020), concerning the deviant informational offer on YouTube, as well as
the work of Erviti et al. (2020) on Google Videos, and Shahsavari et al. (2020) on the
labeling  of  rumors  concerning  the  new  coronavirus,  assisted  by  machine  learning.
From  a  more  qualitative  perspective,  Tuuka  Ylä-Anttila's  (2018) article  is  also
noteworthy in that it crosses qualitative and quantitative analyses to document how
participants in Finnish far-right forums challenge traditional epistemic authorities and
how they produce “counter-knowledge.” The author shows the importance of statistics
and an ultra-positivist mentality in the establishment of this “alternative” knowledge,
an argument that stands in contrast to the notion of a fluctuating “post-truth" and
epistemologies  based  on  personal  experience  (I-pistemologies)  theorized  by  van
Zoonen (2012).
26 This issue is therefore also a contribution to the reflexive questioning of “conspiracies"
in  the  digital  terrain  by  articulating  situated  investigations  of  online  spaces  and  a
theoretical conceptualization of the contemporary social production of truth.
 
For a Comprehensive Sociology of "Conspiracy
Theories" on the Web
Putting it Into Words: “Conspiracy” and Epistemic Tensions
27 The first issue that arises in the rigorous study of these tensions, from a social science
perspective, is that of naming them. This is because of two main reasons. First,  the
phenomena that are usually labeled as conspiracies in scholarly work varies greatly.
Second, this label has important normative implications. The accusations regarding the
alleged  harmful  effects  of  chemtrails,  the  politics  of  mandatory  vaccination,  the
participation of various governments in terrorist attacks (9/11, the Charlie Hebdo
attacks, etc.), the lobbying of industries, not to mention a large number of criticisms
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stemming  from  political  ecology:  all  these  critical  operations  have  been  publicly
designated at one time or another as pertaining to the domain of “conspiracy theories.”
The variety of actors, ideologies, and arguments to which this term is applied testifies
to the weak heuristic quality of the “conspiracy theories” category. By masking the
diversity and complexity of the situations in which it is mobilized, this category runs
the risk of becoming a mere accumulation of discourses that are taken out of their
social contexts of production (France, 2019).
28 The second problem posed by this notion lies in the fact that it does not allow for the
description of  a  substantial  content but rather points  to contradictory processes of
disqualification, successively mobilized by antagonistic actors engaged in controversies
(Lemieux, 2007).  As Luc Boltanski (2014) writes,  “no one claims the authorship of a
conspiracy theory” (p.199). It is therefore urgent to abandon the normative and, as it
turns out, pejorative dimension implied by this notion, as it is not compatible with the
requirements  of  a  comprehensive  approach  in  the  social  sciences.  Despite  the
reluctance that  most  so-called conspiratorial  discourses  has  provoked among social
scientists  (who  are  often  marked  by  their  academic  habitus),  accounting  for  these
phenomena  implies  not  disqualifying  them.  While  this  observation  is  beginning  to
emerge in recent scholarship (France & Motta, 2017; Giry, 2017; Harambam, 2020a)6,
drawing  all  the  consequences  of  the  pejorative,  scientifically--and  politically--
unproductive dimension of the concept of conspiracy implies redefining the very same
phenomena we are interested in. 
29 In the call  for papers for this issue, we chose to speak of informational deviances,  an
expression inspired by interactionist sociology, which could be used to designate, with
a  minimum  of  preconceptions,  a  very  heterogeneous  set  of  critical  operations,
ideological adhesions of varying intensity, which support or relay various political or
scientific  counter-narratives,  whose  minimal  common  denominator  lies  in  the
processes of public disqualification they are subject to. Our intention was to encourage
a variety of contributions while rejecting the tendency in the social sciences to separate
a priori “truth” and “conspiracy theory”, and thus take sides in the social processes of
(dis)qualification that we wanted to analyze in their own right. 
30 At the time of writing this introduction, it seemed to us that the articles that are a part
of this issue invited us to more broadly consider “conspiracy theories” as knowledge
(savoirs)  that  can  be  studied  by  adopting  a  perspective  similar  to  that  of
anthropologists.  In  his  summary work, Nicolas  Adell-Gombert  reminds  us  that  it  is
never  up  to  the  anthropologist  to  separate  “knowledge”  from “non-knowledge”  or
“true” from “false”: “everything is knowledge, as long as this knowledge is inscribed in
human life (even by signs as in astrology, even by a combination of circumstances [...],
even  by  myths)”  (Adell-Gombert,  2011,  pp.  30).  Just  like  Lévi-Strauss  (1958) placed
magic in the same footing with science in the world of knowledge, an anthropological
perspective leads us to consider that knowledge includes magic, know-how, knowledge
tools  and,  more  to  the  point  of  this  issue,  the  stories  sometimes  referred  to  as
“conspiracies.”
31 Approaching “conspiracy theories” as knowledge also has the advantage of inquiring
into their role in the construction of identity, their relationship to power, and issues of
their circulation (Adell-Gombert, 2011). There is obviously an important link between
knowledge and identity, as knowledge constitutes an “identity resource” that enables
the feeling of belonging to a particular community and sometimes is used to disqualify
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those whose knowledge does not conform--a dynamic often documented in the case of
scholarly  communities  with  regards  to  parasciences  (Delbos,  1993;  Lagrange,  1993).
Knowledge, in the sense of the ability to “put the world in order,” is also an important
form of power in many societies (Bowker & Star, 1999; Goody, 1979). For a scholarly
community to exist, it is not enough for knowledge, such as medical knowledge, to be
“mastered and made available”: it must be institutionalized (Adell-Gombert, 2011, pp.
240).  It  is  this  work  of  institutionalization  (which  involves  the  establishment  of
standards, regulated practices between community members, practice sites, etc.) that
provides epistemic authorities with power to enact true knowledge, and which helps to
exclude communities with alternative understandings. A third important dimension of
the study of knowledge is the issue of circulation: “there is no fixed knowledge, stuck in
an individual who has not communicated it to someone and who has not received it
from someone else” (Adell-Gombert, 2011, pp. 251). In contrast to work that focuses on
the  transmission  of  “real  knowledge”  and  knowledge  that  is  taught,  the  double
displacement  that  we  propose  here  consists  of  studying  alternative  knowledge
circulating in less official spaces by analyzing the place and role of digital media in the
deployment, circulation, and dispute of “conspiracy theories” on the internet.
32 As  a  consequence,  drawing  on  the  work  of  Gary  Alan  Fine  (2015),  we  argue  more
specifically  for  using  the  notion  of  “uncertain  knowledge”  to  designate  a
heterogeneous set of representations of the world often disqualified under the term
“conspiracy theories.” Fine is interested in how knowledge’s legitimacy is challenged.
For him, "Knowledge involves a truth claim made by particular actors and judged by
others. It is embedded within a social field, and it is connected to domains of power”
(Fine,  2015,  pp.  137).  Uncertain knowledge thus  refers  to  claims (rumors,  opinions,
beliefs, conspiracies...) that “lack direct access to secure and definite knowledge” (Fine
& Difonzo,  2011,  pp.  18).  As such,  these claims are disputed within communities or
groups that operate as gatekeepers to truth or certainty. Consensus, or the lack of it, is
essential here, in that antagonistic groups seek to disqualify each other by arguing that
they are motivated by hidden ideologies and interests. To study uncertain knowledge is
therefore  to  take  the  competing  dynamics  of  affirmation  and  dispute  of  epistemic
authority as the object of inquiry without judging beforehand neither the success nor
the legitimacy of the groups that engage in these processes.
33 Studying  such  uncertain  knowledge  thus  amounts  to  taking  as  its  very  object  the
competing dynamics of affirmation and contestation of epistemic authority, without
prejudging the success or legitimacy of these undertakings and the groups that pursue
them. For this reason, we will also borrow from the sociology of deviance and the idea
of "stigmatized knowledge" proposed in particular by Michael Barkun (2015), as well as
from  the  work  on  parasciences  (Campbell,  1972;  Lagrange,  1993),  which  is  already
concerned with epistemic competition.
34 Uncertain, stigmatized, parascientific: these representations of the social and natural
worlds must be reintegrated into a coherent sociological program that is interested in
the epistemologies they carry, their material foundations, and the conditions of their
elaboration and circulation, both online and offline. In doing so, we wish to reinscribe
these  representations  in  the  long  and  conflicting  history  of  trust  in  epistemic
authorities (Shapin, 2007), i.e. the institutions in charge of “saying what is of what is”
(dire ce qu’il en est de ce qui est) (Boltanski, 2009, pp. 117). This choice in terminology
allows us to elaborate a theoretical framework that can be broken down into several
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movements that we describe hereafter: suspending normativity; studying a continuum
of critiques; and finally, situating the digital at the core of the analysis.
 
Suspending Normativity
35 Our  first  strategy  is  to  suspend  the  implicit  normativity  regarding  these  objects,
starting by emancipating ourselves from the vocabulary usually employed to describe
these narratives and the actors who espouse them. As can be seen virtually every day in
the debates surrounding the COVID-19 epidemic, the terms “conspiracy theories” and
“conspiracism” are fundamentally generic labels, essentially used to discredit opposing
statements and to disqualify actors perceived as “deviant” from a dominant norm. In
keeping with interactionist approaches that sought to break away from the normative--
and indeed, pejorative--approaches to their objects (Becker, 1991), the call for papers
published in  the  context  of  this  thematic  issue  used the  expression “informational
deviances.” By speaking more generally of “uncertain knowledge,” our aim is to adopt a
posture in which the social scientist does not disqualify the statements under study and
does not judge their veracity.
36 As with other studies on controversial objects such as religious cults (Esquerre, 2009;
Ollion, 2017), this shift makes it possible to respond to a basic requirement of symmetry
in the discussion of these phenomena, which are very often characterized by reciprocal
accusations of conspiracy. If sociologists separate the true from the false (the “truthful”
from the “conspiratorial”), they take sides in the disputes they describe. Just as the
sociology  of  controversies  has  been  doing  for  a  long  time,  it  seems  crucial  to
simultaneously study “conspiracies” and the critique of conspiracy (France, 2019). This
preference  then  authorizes--indeed,  pushes--the  researcher  to  study  all  kinds  of
epistemologies,  including  the  most  implausible  ones  for  what  they  are,  without
comparing them to an implicit or explicit standard of scientificity (Harambam, 2017). In
other words, this approach invites us to investigate eminently conflicting objects with a
minimum of prejudice. Why, indeed, should it be less legitimate to analyze the claims
expressed  by  vaccine  critics  than  those  expressed  more  generally  about  the
pharmaceutical  industry?  The  articles  in  this  issue  seek  to  account  for  alternative
narratives,  their  material  and  cognitive  support,  the  social  conditions  of  their
enunciation and circulation (Esquerre, 2012), their political content (Fine & Rosnow,
1976) and, finally, their claim to the truth.
 
Studying a Continuum of Critiques
37 Second,  we  propose  to  consider  discourses  labeled  as  conspiratorial  not  as  a
homogeneous  and  substantial  category,  but  rather  as  a  diverse  set  of  contesting
epistemologies, situated in a continuum that is critical of the institutions responsible
for defining the truth. As Steve Shapin (2019) notes, our societies are experiencing not
so  much  a  “crisis  of  truth”  but  rather  a  crisis  of  confidence  in  the  institutions
traditionally  responsible  for  defining  that  truth,  particularly  scientific  institutions.
Although it is not always targeted at “textbook science”7, public mistrust is expressed
with increasing intensity in scientific domains where innovation and uncertainty are
prevalent  and  have  strong  political  consequences.  As  the  cases  of  vaccines,
electromagnetic waves, global warming, or endocrine disruptors suggest, criticism is all
Uncertain Knowledge. Studying “Truth” and “Conspiracies” in the Digital Age
RESET, 10 | 2021
11
the more acute when the stakes are high; in other words, “disputed science is science
that seems worth disputing” (Shapin, 2019).
38 Moreover,  it  should be noted that  these critiques do not take the form of  an anti-
science  discourse:  on  the  contrary,  their  proponents  very  often  adopt  a
“hyperscientific” posture, characterized by a critical attitude that seeks to revive the
historical project of true science as a systematic interrogation of reality, autonomous
from  powers  and  particular  interests.  In  an  enlightening  qualitative  investigation,
Harambam and Aupers (2015) showed how skeptical discourses placed themselves on
the terrain of true science by pointing out the specific training of scientists and their
ways of seeing the world, which made them exclude certain interpretations a priori, as
well as the links that unite science and industry, which obliterate the possibility of a
truly  independent  and  neutral  science.  Shapin  (2019) concluded  that  the  growing
distrust towards scientific authorities must be understood in relation to the increasing
entanglement, from the end of the 19th century onwards, between science and two
great powers (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991): “big business” and the State. Catching by
contagion the suspicion towards these two new allies, science would have lost its moral
authority, tied to its disinterested and independent representation.
39 Even when it is not about taking at face value the “scientific” professions of faith of
groups considered to be deviant, it seems that the social sciences cannot afford the
luxury of ignoring them: at a time when climate change seems to make the articulation
between science,  the  market,  and democracy  less  and less  capable  of  ensuring  the
general interest, there is an urgent need for a sociological understanding of the critical
discourses regarding this  triptych,  including those that  are most  often disqualified.
This means reintegrating “conspiracist” epistemologies into the spectrum of critical
operations  aimed  at  describing  reality  (Boltanski,  2009).  Rather  than  a  simplistic
duality in which conspiracy is a impervious and homogeneous category, identified as
the antithesis of scientific discourse about the world, we propose to understand these
objects as part of a continuum of critiques addressed to contemporary techno-scientific
modernity,  regardless  whether  they  are  labelled  as  conspiracies  or  not.  From  the
established whistleblowers to  the most  unanimously discredited discourses,  such as
“Platists,” we need to document the variety of discourses and epistemologies that place
the fabrication of truth in tension, along with the types of evidence and groups they
rely on. In short, the boundaries of science are at stake today: boundaries with private
or  political  interests,  whose  porosity  the  “conspirators”  denounce;  and  boundaries
between  legitimate  and  deviant  science,  which  these  actors  would  like  to  enforce.
Rather  than  taking  sides  in  these  shifting  and  complex  controversies,  the  social
sciences would benefit from observing the boundary work deployed by both sides of
these lines (Gieryn, 1983),  a process that occurs increasingly in an expanded digital
public space.
 
Situating the Digital at the Core of the Analysis
40 Finally,  it  seems  crucial  to  make  room  for  the  social-technical  conditions  of  the
emergence and circulation of “conspiracies” in the analysis. It has become almost a
truism to argue that the Internet changed the conditions for the spread and circulation
of “conspiracy theories.”  As France (2019) aptly notes,  recurrent invocations of  the
“Internet  effect”  in  the  spread  of  “conspiracy  theories”  need  to  be  carefully
Uncertain Knowledge. Studying “Truth” and “Conspiracies” in the Digital Age
RESET, 10 | 2021
12
interrogated  to  transcend  simplistic  and  ahistorical  interpretations.  We  argue  for
transforming this premise into an empirical project. How does the blurring of the social
certification of truth interact with the social and technical structures that characterize
the  various  spaces  of the  social  web?  What  sociotechnical  features  offer  favorable
conditions—or not—for the spread of so-called conspiracy narratives in these spaces?
Why  do  certain  spaces  or  communities  have  enabled  the  proliferation  of  such
discourses? What makes them ideal supports for accelerating the spread of “conspiracy
theories,”  controversies  or  accusations?  How  do  algorithms  favor  the  visibility  of
certain theories at the expense of others (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018)? What role do
algorithmic platforms play in the production of these contents, in their circulation, and
in the construction of  “facts” as robust and obvious (Wyatt,  Harris,  & Kelly,  2016)?
Asking these questions could help evaluate how technical objects, such as algorithms,
software platforms, communication devices or computer codes, enable the formation
and circulation of this type of content.
41 Some  studies  have  begun  to  explore  these  issues.  For  example,  Romain  Badouard
examines the dynamics of discussions around fake news about French politics in this
issue.  He  concludes  that  this  form  of  political  discussion  is  no  different  from
conversations about “real” political news (cf.  Bastard, 2019; Siles & Tristán-Jiménez,
2021).  Similarly,  Le Caroff  and Foulot (2019) have studied adherence to “conspiracy
theories”  in  comments  on  selected  Facebook  pages.  In  a  study  mentioned  above,
Harambam (2020a) investigated the self-perception of members of conspiracy groups
through the circulation of online texts. These types of studies show how online and
offline dimensions are intertwined in the production and circulation of “conspiracy
theories” (Cicchelli & Octobre, 2018; France & Motta, 2017). 
42 This type of study shows the need to build on the numerous insights of digital sociology
to study conspiracy theories and their circulation (Beuscart et al., 2016). It is necessary
to privilege empirical approaches that help going beyond general assertions about the
importance of the internet in their diffusion. Taking these insights one step further
might require using computational methods associated with data science or network
analysis  (Jacomy,  Girard,  Ooghe-Tabanou,  &  Venturini,  2016),  in  order  to  identify
practices  and patterns of  information flow that  are not  always visible  otherwise.  A
comparative  approach  could  also  help  document  the  successes  and  failures  of
particular  narratives  within  diverse  communities  (Smyrnaios  et  al.,  2020).  The
circulation of contestatory epistemologies would thus be usefully reinscribed in the
context of a broad ecology of media and platforms.
 
Overview of Issue Contributions
43 In  the  first  article  of  this  issue,  Elsa  Jaubert and  Vassili  Rivron report  on  the
investigation they conducted among fact-checking journalists, who are in permanent
contact with statements that could be qualified as “conspiracies.” Located in several
French  newsrooms since  the  end  of  the  2000s,  these  fact-checking  services  aim to
“decide what is true” (Graves, 2016). The study’s originality lies in explaining how fact-
checking journalists establish a relationship with the category of “conspiracy theories,”
drawing on observations and interviews conducted in three of the seven fact-checking
units of the French press: “CheckNews” at Libération, “Factuel” at AFP and “Fake Off” at
20 Minutes. Even if the label “conspiracy” is used in various ways in these three units, it
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only appears in a minority of the published articles (about 1% of the articles published
by “CheckNews”). Instead of using this generalizing label, journalists seek to test the
veracity of the statements they verify. Only those statements that pass the double filter
of being “checkable” (ideally via supporting scientific and institutional sources) and
“viral” (based on the number of shares on social media) are considered by journalists,
who  tend  to  exclude  statements  for  which  sources  are  lacking  and  that  have  not
become  viral.  Finally,  the  article  shows  that  rather  than  being  a  showcase  for
newsrooms, this new form of journalism aims to regain public trust through greater
transparency of sources and verification methods. To achieve this goal, fact-checkers
nevertheless assume that they must systematically rely on institutional sources, thus
participating de facto in the maintenance of existing epistemic authorities. 
44 Drawing on a database created by journalists from the fact-checking unit of Le Monde
(“Les Décodeurs”), Romain Badouard is interested in how readers appropriate false
information in daily discussions on social media. The investigation is based on a corpus
of 234 articles identified as false information by “Les Décodeurs” and a second corpus
of 350 comments associated with posts on Facebook where these articles were shared.
The author’s aim is not so much to investigate the “conspiracy” dimension of these
statements  but  rather  to  examine  the  specificities  of  discussing  “fake  news.” By
considering  both  a  set  of  political  “fake  news”  and  their  respective  comments  on
Facebook, Badouard thus sought to characterize their reception. A first result suggests
that fact-checking comments do not seem to have any major impact on the nature of
the comments or the dynamics of exchanges between commentators. The analysis of
politicization issues in these comments and their contradictory character allows the
author to conclude that discussing false information and traditional news are in fact
remarkably similar. The more the Facebook pages are politically inclined, the less the
debate is contradictory, and vice versa. In contrast to common assumptions, the study
shows that “fake news” are less tools of influence than a support for individuals who
are already convinced by the statements they are discussing, as is also the case for news
discussions more broadly (Bastard, 2019; Siles & Tristán-Jiménez, 2021). 
45 Gaël  Stephan and  Ysé  Vauchez investigated  “reinformation”  media  activists,  an
identitarian movement at the origin of information sites that oppose the mainstream
media.  More  precisely,  the  authors  were  interested  in  the  “Golden  Lies"  (“Bobards
d’Or”), an annual parody ceremony that rewards “[journalists] who do not hesitate to
deliberately  lie  in  order  to  serve  political  correctness,”  and  which  constitutes  an
important moment of sociability for the reinformation movement. The authors draw
on a rich and original fieldwork, both online and offline, which includes an analysis of a
corpus  of  111  bobards  available  on  the  event's  website,  observations  of  three
ceremonies, and interviews with leaders of reinformation sites. From the outset, the
results show how media activists stage (literally, at the Théâtre du Gymnase in Paris)
their radical critique of the system and its “political correctness,” while also arguing
for their own subjective and militant approach. The originality of the analysis lies in
the authors’ account of how these media activists balance out a critique of traditional
journalism that also appropriates its main codes and norms. The press card, hated as a
symbol of conformism, is at the same time used as a mark of legitimacy to introduce
speakers during the ceremony. Fact-checking practices are turned against traditional
media:  by  fact-checking  information  published  by  big  media  groups,  reinformation
“mediactivists”  denounce  their  incapacity  to  uphold  the  professional  and  ethical
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standards of journalism. As with other articles in this issue, this example illustrates the
diversity  of  realities  covered  by  the  category  of  “fact-checking”  by  putting  into
perspective the promise of truth that it embodies: verification practices that are meant
to be pedagogical in traditional newsrooms, debates fueled by rationalist influencers on
Twitter  and,  in  this  case,  public  accusations  regarding the  “lies  of  the  mainstream
media” made by extreme right-wing media in France.
46 Antonin Segault's article follows the longitudinal circulation of a rumor on Twitter.
Using  the  example  of  a  controversy  concerning  the  radioactive  contamination  of
drinking water  with tritium during the summer of  2019 in France,  he looks at  the
mechanisms of production, circulation, and articulation of rumors on social media. The
investigation  is  based  on  a  corpus  of  nearly  5,000  tweets  produced  during  the
controversy fueled by this rumor in July 2019. The author adopts the interactionist
approach espoused by this special issue, which aims to distance itself from the question
of veracity in order to focus on the work of qualification, and thus of labeling, that
statements are subjected to. This approach allows Segault to produce a narrative in two
phases. In the first phase, the rumor essentially involves two groups of traditionally
opposing actors, the “anti-” and the “pro-nuclear.” Their disagreements, apparently
irreconcilable, center on technical subjects such as the issue of toxicity thresholds or
the effects of low doses of radiation. However, both actors end up joining forces against
a common enemy: journalists from the “traditional” media, who are accused of poor
professionalism and sensationalism,  especially  in  their  coverage of  scientific  issues.
Actors who claim to be rationalists and zetetics use the tritium affair as a support for
articulating a more general critique of the media and the theories that they label as
“pseudo-scientific.” This investigation thus strongly resonates with recent work on the
“guardians  of  reason,”  that  is,  teachers,  engineers,  and  popularizers  turned  into
defenders of “good science” on social media (Foucart et al., 2020). Segault shows in turn
how the criticism of the media on Twitter is  accompanied by the emergence of so-
called “influencers,” local authority figures who have positioned themselves as new
guarantors of science against what they consider as forms of obscurantism.
47 Finally, Mélissa Roy is interested in the rhetorical work deployed by groups that make
contradictory statements in the context of health controversies, particularly those that
lead to accusations of “conspiracy.” At the time of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa
(2013-2016), traditional funerals (during which the bodies are washed, made up, and
caressed before being buried) were “secured” in order to contain the spread of the
disease, thus provoking important controversies between health authorities and those
who challenged these measures.  Considering the Ebola case, the author proposes to
specifically analyze the accusatory discourses that emerge “in the opposition between a
biosecurity policy and culturally significant socializations and routines.” The research
is based on a corpus of 3,469 tweets and 2,774 Facebook comments that are grouped in
five  main  types  of  arguments  (called  “accusatory  frames”)  mobilized  during  this
controversy. In addition to identifying these main accusatory rhetorics, one of the main
contributions of this study lies in its examination of how these frames were used. The
author shows that several actors were regularly targeted as those responsible for the
spread of the epidemic: religious and community leaders, who are accused of sharing
“non-medical”  knowledge;  regional  governments,  blamed  for  their  immobility  and
irresponsibility; and, more generally, “irrational” individuals who refused to comply
with the prescriptions of  biosecurity policies.  The case studied by Mélissa Roy thus
strongly resonates with the present situation with COVID-19 and the controversies that
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can arise from the deprivation of social ties in pandemic management policies. This
offers a particularly rich terrain for thinking about dynamics of accusation at work in
the context of major crises where the media and health institutions seem to occupy the
role of epistemic authorities that are difficult to challenge.
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NOTES
1. See the IFOP-Jean Jaurès Foundation-Conspiracy Watch study, which states that eight people
out of ten in France believe in at least one conspiracy theory: http://www.conspiracywatch.info/
une-grande-enquete-sur-le-complotisme-dans-lopinion-publique-francaise-revele-une-realite-
alarmante.html
2.  We  do  not  distinguish  here  between  “conspiracy  theories”  and  “conspiracism”,
categories often used interchangeably in the literature and in public debate.
3. The previous work of Edgar Morin about the “Rumor of Orléans” (1969), often cited on this
subject,  also  show an early  interest  for  conspiratory  schemes  fraught  with  antisemitism;  its
sociological and empirical dimensions constitute nonetheless an important difference with the
previously quoted studies.
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4. This goes along with a tendency to focus strongly on texts, and much less on their contexts of
circulation and reception,  from the classics of  conspiratory literature like The Protocols  of  the
Elders of Zion to today’s websites and social media.
5. For  example,  it  seems difficult  to  understand “what  the Internet  does  to  the diffusion of
beliefs” (Bronner, 2011) only by observing the first results of a handful of Google queries about
aspartame or the Loch Ness monster, thus simulating how would act an hypothetical “average
Internet user” (p.43).
6. See also Quaderni (2017, vol.94) and Etudes de communication (2019, vol.53).
7. With the notable exception of Darwin’s theory of evolution and of copernican cosmology,
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